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1. Aristotle stated (Eth. Nikom. V,3) that money is called nómisma 
because its value is not based on nature but on a norm (nómos). This is in 
my opinion a fitting characterization of the problems of the money unit, true 
in a very profound sense. If the value of money is based upon a social 
norm, this means that the problems of inflation call for an analysis of the 
reasons affecting the adherence to legal or other social norms. 
This leads us to the methodological problem of a (causal) explanation and 
understanding of human behaviour (von Wright 1967). If inflation is conceived 
of as a problem concerning adherence QÍ human behaviour to norms, it should 
be understood as a process of human reasoning, not a phenomenon caused by 
certain factors. 
The present paper is based upon a more comprehensive study on Roman 
inflation : it is in my opinion suited to a sample of studies in honour of 
Elemér Pólay, who is a grand-master in questions pertaining to thé differen-
tiation of social norms in Rome. Inflation is in my opinion a problem con-
cerning the limits of law and other social norms (see in a greater detail 
Klami 1983). 
2. The main idea of the present analysis is delusively simple. The ancient 
inflation is a very complex phenomenon concerning human reasoning. It 
cannot be either explained or understood by reference to one fact. The main 
problem is the strength of the Aristotelian nómos of nómisma: why do people 
trust in money — or distrust it? The problem of the efficacy and validity 
of social norms is very complex indeed (see Klami 1983). In this case the 
problem is even more perplexing because money is the measure of very dif-
ferent commodities. According to this basic methodology inflation is a nor-
mative problem — in a certain manner-similar to such problems as criminality 
etc. Therefore it calls for a (qualitative) model of understanding behaviour 
and not for a quantitative explanatory model. Therefore I have taken the 
liberty of expressing my opinion on a very difficult problem of economic 
theory of which I am not an expert (cf. Schneider 1965). 
3. The main features of the Roman inflation are relatively well known 
(see, e.g. Segrè 1941 and 1943, Mickwitz 1932a, 1935) and need not be analysed 
here in detail. It is sufficient to mention them: 
(3.1.) The almost continuous depreciation of the main coinage, the imperial 
silver money beginning in the time of Nero; the coins of the young Nero 
contained still 93,2 pet silver, but the content was under Septimius Severus 
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only very - slightly ;©v,er 5l0< p'ct,. tinder Gallienus 6nly * f pets and under 
Diocletian ho more than' 2,5 pet. Silver coins were then only seemingly silver 
money (Mickwitz 1933, Mickwitz 1935). 
(3.2) Inflation went on. If the level of prices under Antoninus Pius is 
marked with' the index figure 100, we are during the last years of Marcus 
Aurelius already at 107—113 and under Gallienus at 160—180; but later the 
varation of prices was — at least in Egypt — stronger still. The value of the 
denar in a.D. 301 is marked with 100, but in 307 the figure was already 300 
and seven years later, i.e. 314 not less than 2800. On the other hand, a certain 
deflation took place, but already a.D. 341 the index was as high as 206.000, 
being five years later again 86.400 (Mickwitz 1935). 
There have been very numerous attempts to explain inflatory tendencies 
in the Roman empire (e.g. Rostovtzeff 1929, Frank 1959, Finley 1973). The 
theories proposed are similar to the present discussion concerning monetary v. 
demand-supply explanation of modern inflation. It is sufficient to mention 
central tendencies and theories: 
(a) The quantity of money increased, thus causing inflation. This was the 
theory, of Gunnar Mickwitz who in the thirties delivered very important 
contributions to the theory of ancient Roman economy (Mikwitz 1932a). To 
Mickwitz the prices were determined according to the following function, 
based upon the quantity of money: 
where P = the price level, M = the quantity of money, V = the velocity of 
its circulation and T = the extension of exchange of goods and money. 
It is to be noted that this function was according to Mickwitz not only á 
definition; it is understandable that Mickwitz and other authors adhering to 
this kind of theory did not want to exaggerate the inflation as a factor 
influencing the structure of economy. Mickwitz did not think that inflation 
should have caused a return to an economy based upon exchange of domestic 
products (even if there were certain such tendencies, cf. Mazzarino 1951). 
(b) It is also often claimed that the spendthrift Emperors caused the 
economy , of the Empire to come to a disorder. This is particularly stressed by 
ancient historians. (Suetonius, Zosimos, Zonaras etc.) who tell us astonishing 
(and often unreliable) stories about the vices and stupidities of the Emperors 
(cf. Mickwitz 1932b; Syme 1930). 
(c) Reorganization of the army is often said to have been the cause of 
inflation: when the wages of the soldiers rose and began to be paid in cash 
instead of being hoarded in the treasuries of the paymasters, and the soldiers 
were allowed to marry and have families in the barracks, the places where 
the units of the army were located became centers of consumers, consumption 
— and demand (cf. Bruun 1965). But it would surely not be correct to 
establish a causal connection with the alleged growth of the army and the 
equally improbable general decrease of production of commodities (cf. Visky 
1983, p. 233 et seq.). 
(d) On the other hand, there are different attempts to explain inflatory 
phenomena by factors pertaining to fluctuations of demand and supply. The 
most "natural" explanation of this kind is a reference to changing harvests of 
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different sorts of grain. But this would only imply a change of supply; a 
major part of the population lived in conditions near to the minimum demands 
of existence (Frank 1959). 
4. In my opinion, however, all these explanations are insufficient or 
misleading — just because they are explanations, alleged causes of inflation. 
The main problem is that the inflatory tendencies are during certain periods 
— at least in Egypt — so strong that one cannot easily explain them by 
referring ;to a linear mathematical function. The quality of money did not 
decrease in such a manner that it could explain inflation; the value of gold 
coinage decreased even if one cannot assume that the amount of aurei or 
solidi should have increased in a corresponding manner; on the other hand, it 
is clear that the gold content of this kind of coinage did not decrease (cf. 
Segre. 1943). 
Certain partly unexpected events could of course cause inflatory ten-
dencies by influencing human reasoning but their strength is very difficult 
to estimate. During the 2nd and 3rd centuries a.D. there were severe disturb-
ances of civil life. Of course these phenomena were partly only local. In places 
where troops invaded, prices almost inevitably rose. On the other hand, fluc-
tuations of harvest were not unexpected; they belonged to the normal sphere 
of experience of people. But they could "cause" remarkable uncertainty (Ros-
tovtzeff 1929). 
In this situation certain aspects of norm-formation are to be taken into 
consideration. There is a basic transformation behind social norms — legal 
and other. Teleology — with its cognitive and evaluative components — is 
transformed into normativity. But this transformation is not complete or 
final: normativity is to be revised if knowledge or evaluations are changed 
(Klami 1983). The value of money is based upon certain assumptions of ceteris 
paribus. A certain fluctuation of the prices is hereby assumed — in our days 
also a certain inflation belongs to the iron core of the cognitive aspect of the 
legal and other social norm-formation. 
But there are situations where the basic assumptions of ceteris paribus 
are shaken. In these situations the change of the relevant background, as-
sumptions cannot be conceived of with the help of a model of thinking of a 
deterministic kind. We can draw up a function but there are too many 
stochastic elements in it: How are certain relevant states of affairs going to 
develop? — and, what is perhaps even more important: How are other people 
reacting to the changes? 
When we are trying to understand inflation we should be well aware of 
the fact that we cannot fully explain inflation: the models used are not 
regular, there is no linear regalarity: the reactions of men toward stochastic 
phenomena are often disproportional when compared to the quantitative 
relevance of the uncertainty in question. E.g.: an Emperor is letting the silver 
content of silver coinage to sink. A sinking of this kind, say, 10 per cent, 
cannot, of course, explain an inflation of 50 per cent but it can make it 
understandable because reactions of men in conditions of uncertainty con-
cerning social norms are not linear in comparison with the change of the 
uncertain aspects of the situation; it is also clear that such a sinking of the 
silver content of money cannot explain the growth of the quantity of money 
in such a manner as the quantitative and moneratian models presuppose it 
(cf. Schneider 1965). 
265: 
5. There were in the Roman Empire mechanisms creating — or tending to -
create — demand-supply-inflation. I try to describe the main mechanisms 
very briefly. 
(I) The imperial economy and administration was responsible for the grain 
supply of Rome: there was an organization headed by the praefectus an-
nonae, which collected the victuals needed. The methods were of two kinds: 
(a) land taxes were paid in natura (b) purchase (cf. already Rodbertus 1865, 
and recently, Hamza 1981). 
(II) Italy and especially the regions near Rome had a "surplus population" 
whose standard of living and number was unproportionally high when com-
pared to the basic production of Italy. One may say that there was a per-
manent deficit of the balance of trade for Italy in the Roman Empire. The balance 
of payment was, of course, adjusted with the help of taxation and other 
means of exploitation (cf. Rostovtzeff 1929 I, 87; 164 f; Syme 1930). 
(III) The basic production of the Empire — e.g. the harvest of grain in 
Egypt — was variable depending, inter alia, on weather circumstances. 
(IV) Later, especially during the 3rd century a.D. internal wars caused 
serious disorder and uncertainty in central areas of the Empire. The trend 
was, however, clear: the old „provinces" and similar areas had become both 
politically and economically more independent than earlier. In a corresponding 
manner the central position of Rome and Italy in the Empire slowly but 
surlely weakened (on the whole problem see Vogt 1965). 
There was a certain mechanism in the economy of the Empire which 
promoted inflatory tendencies. When Italy needed grain, the Emperor could 
provide for it through taxes or by paying for it. The Emperor was, moreover, 
legally entitled to issue money which was valid in the whole Empire. 
Let us now assume that the harvest had been bad. This (a) tended to 
reduce the flow of the land taxes paid in natura (b) but because of the li-
mited supply of grain also caused a tendency to raise the prices paid for grain. 
It is also important to note that the grain trade was subject to private 
speculation. Lex Iulia de annona which was issued in the beginning of the 
principate tried to prohibit different methods of private speculation, such as 
private contracts or cartels (societas) with the aim to make the annona more 
expensive, or attempts at delaying grain ships from coming to Rome. But the 
sanction was according to Ulpian a relatively small fine (20 units of golden 
money, itp.) (See Ulpian, D. 48. 12. 2; cf. Hamza 1981). 
It is probable that this statute was ineffective; Ulpian tells us that the 
punishment had later been made more severe. Now — probably in the Se-
veran time — the prohibition of cartels for purchase of victuals was also 
applied to other victuals than grain; the "hoarders", called dardanarii, could 
now lose their rights as merchants; moreover, even relegation could come 
into question (Hamza 1981). The new statute belonged to the edict of the 
proconsuls; this seems to indicate that the problem was now more crucial than 
ever and in particular in the provin/ces. Lex lulia de annona referred stiill 
clearly to Roman speculants, but they evidently did no longer possess the 
control over the trade (see Ulpian D. 47. 11. 6 pr). 
But neither did the imperial administration have the control over the 
situation. Legislation has its limits in the (normative) structure of production 
and trade (cf. Junnila 1947). Criminal sanctions alone cannot prevent specu-
lation, unless the legislator can control the whole market. This was not the 
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case. It was also apparent when Diocletian's well-known prince edict failed to 
fix real price ceilings one hundred years after Ulpian's commentary on the 
edict of the proconsuls. Very simply: if the legal prices of certain goods do 
not correspond to the prices conditioned by the market situation including 
demand and supply, the commodities in question tend to disappear from the 
controlled market — if it is possible to store them, they become "hoarded," 
or otherwise a black market is born. This is rather trivial national economics 
— but how often have those in power over-estimated the effectiveness of 
their will and commands. One cannot blame Roman Emperors too heavily for 
their lack of insight in economic questions because governments in our days 
still make the same mistakes in over-estimating the impact of legal norms on 
the economy-based social norms which govern the behaviour of the more or 
less "economic men" (cf. Adam Smith) of the society: 
(a) that it is possible to solve problems concerning "business cycles" or 
changing conditions of demand and supply by resorting to monetary methods 
alone; 
(b) that ineffective legislative measures cause no harm because they 
remain ineffective if they miss their aim; in fact thep, however, often 
give rise to serious disorder, because they are adversely affecting the con-
formity of economic behaviour. In short, they cause uncertainty, and this is 
easily visible in the value of money just because it is based in a "nomos" and 
not on nature. 
It was for the Emiperors easier to pay the prices demanded for victuals 
(and other commodities) than to regulate the prices: the Emperors could issue 
new money (cf. Syme 1930; Mickwitz 1932b). The supply of gold and silver 
was of course not unlimited but the invention of issuing "bad" money with a 
lesser silver content helped to some extent. Emperors since Nero made small 
"adjustments" of the silver coinage which sank from 93 pet (Nero in the 
beginning) to 84 (Trajan), to 74 (Septimius Severus), to 44 (Alexander Se-
verus), to 20 (Valerianus) and to 2,5 (Diocletian). It should be stressed, how-
ever, that this decline was relatively slow (except for the 3rd century) and the 
"adjustments" small; there were during the reign of the same Emperors dif-
ferent silver contents. Some Emperors apparently tried to issue better money: 
Volusianus let the silver content raise to 61 pet from 35 (Gallus). This was 
probably one method to take up fight against inflation. It is, howewer, easy 
to see that inflation cannot be caused by such measures as augmenting the 
amount of money circulating in the economy. The differences between new 
money'and old money were not very big; in fact the Emperors tried to keep 
the deterioration of money secret in order to maintain the nominal value 
equality between old and new money. The amount of new money could never 
have been very big, because the supply of silver was limited. 
Increase of money — and bad money to boot — cannot, howewer, have 
been so great that it could have caused heavy inflatory tendencies; at least 
the dependance between the amount and quality of money and inflation is not 
a linear function. 
But monetary aspects are an important part of the economic reasoning, 
and monetary measures of the Emperors could "cause" uncertainty. This was 
particularly so because they often coincided with bad harvest and scarcity of 
commodities or with internal disorder, aspects which already as such caused 
uncertainty. When the emperors reacted to such events by increasing the 
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amount of money, the result of the reasoning in economic interaction wa£ -
easily a lack of confidence in money, but the reactions of the economy could 
vary in different times and in different parts of the Empire. 
It is important to note that inflation also affected good money: the value 
of gold coinage sank even if one could not think that its amount should have 
much increased. 
6. Normative regularities concerning the value of money are more or less 
clearly expressed in certain legal mechanisms. In our days it is relatively easy 
to foresee inflation: the economic regularities are well-known, and there are 
prognoses which — as social prognoses often do — affect the reasoning of thie 
men whose behaviour is their object. Expected inflation and numerical prog-
noses concerning it become parts of reasoning. In antiquity there were no 
such prognoses; moreover, certain modern institutions which create regularity 
were unknown (banks, especially central banks with powers to regulate the 
rate of interest etc.). Banks had other functions (Boulvert 1968; Klami 1969). 
There are in our days certain contractual methods to take account of 
inflation; but if such methods are lacking, this fact contributes to uncertainty 
and, accordingly, affects adversely the value of money. We can only very 
briefly treat of these methods. 
(a) Rate of interest. In Roman Law the rate of interest was relatively 
inflexible: the legitimae usurae did not allow for legal methods for taking 
account of inflation. There may, however, have been illegal rates of interest 
— e.g. the mora clause of paratheke diple was probably in certain cases used 
in order to surpass the maximum rate of interest. 
(b) Index clauses were of course unknown. But to a certain extent the 
law concerning laesio enormis in the contract of sale was a primitive substitute 
for such clauses. It is not completely sure whether these norms were in-
troduced by Justinian or whether they were earlier. In my opinion this device 
can be traced back to the period of the big inflation, i.e. to the end of the 3rd 
century a. D. According to this doctrine such contracts of sale could be 
invalidated or adjusted where the stipulated price was less than 50 pet of 
the day value of the object (C. 3. 4. 46. 2): this was later, also during the 
Middle Ages, developed to a moral philosophical doctrine of pretium iustum. 
(I agree with Visky when he declines the usual interpolation assumptions 
concerning the Diocletian texts, see Visky' 1983 p. 24 et seq. But why should 
the judicial practice have ignored recently established norms concerning just 
prices and the laesio enormis — until Justinian restored the spirit of Diocle-
tian's regulation? Despite Visky's acute remarks this still remains to be 
explained.) Concrete regulation of prices cannot, however, have any great 
impact upon the price level. It covers only a small part of the. cases. 
(c) Identity of coins and inspection of the quality and weight of money 
played a relatively important part in everyday economy in Rome. Inspected 
money was put in bags with closing "bricks," tesserae nummularie (Klami 
1969). But even if there are in the papyri certain clauses specifying the money 
to be used (kainon nomisma) (palaion nomisma), these references are an 
execption to the rule which was clearly nominalism. 
The primitive state of the legal methods for taking account of inflation 
undoubtedly contributed to the uncertainty. 
It is, however, obvious that inflation as such was not considered as a big 
problem. Therefore it is understandable that Roman Emperors were more 
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interested in getting the grain which Italy and the Roman man of the street 
(taken in a literal sense) demanded. Plinius praises Trajan for his efficient 
methods of purchasing grain: he let his iiegotiatores frumentarii pay as much 
as was demanded, all this in order to guarantee the availability of victuals in 
Rome and Italy (Plinius, Paneg. 29. 3. 5). But Trajan had to issue bad money 
(cf. Syme 1930), too; on the other hand, a steady flow of grain to Italy 
entailed scarcity in some other place. If the place in question simultaneously 
got a considerable amount of (new, bad) money, this could lead there to un-
foreseeable inflatory tendencies. 
7. Adherence of people to legal or other social norms is connected with 
teleology consisting of cognitive and evaluative components. Uncertainty con-
cerning teleology may entail that also social norms are felt as uncertain. This 
is in my opinion the case also as to phenomena of inflation. 
The problem is that inflation cannot be explained by monetary models: 
one can hardly assume that big inflatory tendencies should have been caused 
by relative slow changes of the quality of money; nor can it be assumed that 
these changes should have caused a very big increase in the amount of money 
circulating in Roman economy. One might of course construe such assumptions 
in order to "save" the basic monetarian explanations of inflation. I am not 
claiming that I have found a new explanation for inflation in antiquity, even 
if I liked to stress demand-supply-aspects as the main parts of the 
people's reasoning, monetary aspects being a kind of conclusion from them. 
But these connections cannot be expressed with the help of linear functions, 
because inflation is in ultima analysi a problem of human reasoning and as 
such not simply "caused". Of course one can use quasi-causal models of 
explanation when reasoning is understood. But one cannot say that these 
models are real "explanations" because reasoning is another thing. 
Inflation is a riddle which cannot be solved by historical studies: in-
teraction of human reasoning is not depending on fixed laws. Modern eco-
nomists can of course explain inflation — because their explanations and 
prognoses are influencing the phenomena that they are trying to explain. But 
what about the legal problem? It is in my opinion highly significant that 
there were no efficient legal remedies against heavy inflation, although Roman 
Law should not have been alien to such principles. There are several pos-
sibilities for explaining this "deficiency." The first one is that Roman lawyers 
lacked the innovative spirit needed. This is not convincing, because Roman 
Law was usually capable to cope with any real problem of the contem-
poraneous society. But more likely is the explanation that inflation was not 
wholly detrimental: there were persons . and groups who benefited by 
the phenomenon. It is probable that their interests dictated the main focus of 
the regulation. Their interests did not coincide with the interests of those in 
power and the owner class. There is no straightforward relationship between 
interests, power and law. Even for this reason the study of legal and social 
history is interesting: should there be only one answer, given in advance by 
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P. S. 
The lateast book of the eminent Hungarian Romanist Kâroly Visky was sent to 
me when the text of my essay had already been written and checked. For this 
reason, a more detailed analysis of his thoughts was not possible. 
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